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BOOK REVIEWS

God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, & Human Autonomy, by John E.
Hare. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2001. Pp. x and 122
(indexed). $14.00 (cloth).
JANINE MARIE IDZIAK, Loras College
1his book records the three Stob Lectures given by John Hare at Calvin
College in October 1999. Overall, Hare's aim is to offer "an account of
God's authority in human morality" (p. vii). The subtitle indicates the
focus of each lecture.
The first chapter presents a history of the twentieth century debate
between moral realists, who emphasize the reality of value properties independent of our attempts at evaluation, and moral expressivists, who emphasize the role of value judgment in expressing the will or emotion or desire
(p.l). Hare's review and critical assessment of this body of literature leads
to an articulation of his own position of prescriptive realism, which is "the
view that when a person judges that something is good, he is endorsing
(from inside) an attraction (from outside) which he feels towards it" (p.
viii). In other words, "an evaluative judgment endorses a response to a
pull of the good which is there independently of the evaluation" (p. 49).
Hare further suggests that we can "identify this pull of the good as God's
call to us" (pA9), which leads into a divine command ethical theory.
Specifically, an ethics of divine commands "sees our obligations as an
expression of God's will, and then our judgments of obligation as an
expression of our will to recapitulate God's willing in ours" (p. 49).
Hare remarks that "Divine command theory is an option that most recent
ethicists in philosophy have dismissed" and sees natural law theory as having "taken possession of the field as the theist alternative to a secular ethical
theory" (p. 49). He proposes two explanations for this state of affairs. The
first is "the negative power of an argument by Kant" (p. 50) concerning
human autonomy. The second reason is that "ethicists have not taken seriously the complex and difficult writing on this issue by the thirteenth-century Franciscan philosopher and theologian John Duns Scotus" (p. 50).
I will focus my discussion of Hare's book on the second chapter dealing
with Duns Scotus. I do this because of the praise Hare lavishes on Scotus
in claiming that "the version of divine command theory which Scotus
gives us is the best we have" and that "anyone should be interested in it
who wants to say that what makes something obligatory for us is that God
commands it" (p. 52). While pointing out some rough spots in Hare's
understanding of Scotus, I will call attention to two areas of his lecture
which can advance our discussion of an ethics of divine commands.

Exegesis of Scotus
To praise Scotus as offering the best version of divine command theory
available presupposes that Scotus is to be placed squarely within the
divine command camp. However, in even classifying Scotus as a divine
command ethicist, a more nuanced exegesis of Scotus is needed than that
given by Hare.
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In speaking of Scotus as a divine command ethicist, the first text that
Hare brings forward is from Reportata Parisiensia I, distinction 48, question
one: "The divine will is the cause of the good, and so a thing is good precisely in virtue of the fact that God wills it." l While this statement seems
like a clear commitment to an ethics of divine commands, there are also
texts in the Reportata Parisiensia which are inconsistent with adherence to
an ethics of divine commands, specifically, texts which describe some
actions as evil in themselves.' Before accusing Scotus of hopeless inconsistency in his ethics, we should take note of Allan Wolter's reminder that the
Reportata Parisiensia represents "unexamined student reports." 3 A more
reliable source for Scotus' views is the Ordinatio, his revision of his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard:
Hare has correctly recognized that Ordinatio III, suppl. distinction 37, on
whether all the commandments of the decalogue belong to the natural law,
is a critical text in understanding Scotus'ethical views (see pp. 67-78).
However, Hare has not correctly interpreted the import of this text with
respect to Scotus' commitment to an ethics of divine commands.
In answering the question posed, Scotus distinguishes two senses in
which a precept can be said to belong to the law of nature. Speaking strictly,
the natural law contains only first practical principles known from their
terms, and precepts which are conclusions necessarily entailed by these principles. Speaking more broadly, the law of nature is said to include precepts
which are in harmony with the aforementioned first practical principles,
although not following necessarily from them. According to Scotus, the first
two commandments of the decalogue belong to natural law strictly interpreted while all the commandments of the second table are part of the naturallaw only in the broader sense. Scotus is more tentative with respect to the
third commandment of the decalogue concerning the Sabbath, raising
doubts that this precept belongs to the natural law in a strict sense. s
Scotus' consideration of the status of the commandments of the decalogue
involves the possibility of God granting dispensations to these precepts.
According to Scotus, "to dispense does not consist in letting the precept
stand and permitting one to act against it"; rather, "to dispense .. .is to revoke
the precept or declare how it is to be understood."6 After presenting this definition of dispensation, Scotus gives a reformulation of the question whether
the commandments of the decalogue are subject to dispensation which clearly indicates that, in this context, he has in mind a situation in which God
revokes the precept? And if God can grant such a dispensation from a precept which e.g., forbids a certain type of action, then it is the case that God
can bring it about that act a in circumstances c is forbidden at one time but is
not forbidden at another time. Hence, Scotus' notion of divine dispensation
with respect to the commandments of the decalogue is of a case in which
God literally changes the moral status of a particular type of action.
Soctus maintains that God cannot grant a dispensation from precepts
which belong to the natural law in a strict sense, and hence, from the first
and second precepts of the decalogue. 8 Scotus is thus claiming that it is not
within God's power to revoke these precepts and to change the moral status of the actions described in them. In effect, he regards the first and second commandments of the decalogue as obtaining independently of Cod.
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Because of this, Scotus cannot be regarded as articulating a thoroughgoing
ethics of divine commands in this text. He did, however, make progress
towards the articulation of the divine command position by his views on
the commandments of the second table of the decalogue. For Scotus commits himself to the position that these moral principles owe their status to
God, first, in maintaining that God was not required to endorse the precepts belonging to the second table although God in fact did SO,9 and second, in recognizing God's ability to grant dispensations to the commandments of the second table.lO
Hare recognizes the two ways in which a precept can be said to belong
to the natural law, viz., strictly and broadly, and concomitantly, he correctly perceives Scotus' application of this distinction to the first and second
tables of the decalogue. (pp. 67, 72). Hare is also cognizant of Scotus' views
on divinely granted dispensations to the precepts of the second table of the
decalogue (p. 73), and correctly describes the precepts of the second table
as "within God's discretion" (p. 73; see also p. 75). However, Hare fails to
recognize that the text in question commits Scotus only to a partial ethics of
divine commands.

Human Nature
Fundamentally, natural law ethics maintains that what is right and wrong
is based on human nature. Some natural law ethicists go so far as to claim
that moral precepts can be deduced from true statements about human
nature (p. 54). Hare maintains that Scotus rejects such a deductive model
(p.63).
According to Scotus, the final end of human beings is union with God,
more exactly, becoming co-lovers with God and entering into the love that
exists between the three persons of the Trinity (pp. 66-7). Hare interprets
Scotus as holding that "there is no necessary connection between our created natures and the way we reach our final end" (p. 69). At least with
respect to the precepts regarding our neighbor, the way by which humans
reach their final end is at God's discretion (p. 75). As Hare puts it:
There are innumerable ways God could have ordered us towards
union, even given the nature with which we were created. The route
God has in fact chosen is binding upon us because God has chosen it.
(p.77)
The correctness of Hare's interpretation of Scotus on this point is evidenced by the dispensations which Scotus thought that God has granted to
the precepts of the decalogue. For example, polygamy as well as
monogamy was allowed to the ancient patriarchs. J1 Or again, Hare himself
makes note of Scotus' recognition of both private property and common
property as possible structures for life in a community or state (pp. 68~69)
and hence as compatible with human nature.
Since human nature is so central to natural law thinking, Hare's discussion is insightful in raising of the question of the relation between moral
precepts and human nature within the framework of an ethics of divine
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commands. We can look to the historical literature to stimulate our think,
ing about this.
For example, in his defense of the divine command theory the fourteenth century Franciscan Andrew of Neufchateau considers the objection
that the theory entails that God could command a human being to "fly and
do contradictory things at the same time."12 Andrew replies that flit is
impossible to obligate to actions which are inconsistent with human
nature."13 For God willing that human beings fly or do contradictory
things simultaneously would be "for God to will to do what is not doable
and thus for God to will irrationally and in a way subject to frustration ... ".14
In effect, Andrew is suggesting that human nature delineates a range of
possible actions for human beings and that divine commands concerning
right and wrong actions must operate within the parameters established by
human nature.
An even stronger connection between divine commands and human
nature is postulated by John Locke in his Essays on the Law of Nature:
"Hence, this law of nature can be described as being the decree of the
divine will discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and
what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason
commanding or prohibiting."ls That Locke is still placing priority on the
divine will is indicated by his comment on natural law immediately following this statement: "It appears to me less correctly termed by some people the dictate of reason, since reason does not so much establish and pronounce this law of nature as search for it and discover it as a law enacted
by a superior power ... ".16 Nevertheless, in claiming that God chooses the
precepts which he does because of their conformity with our rational
human nature, Locke is working towards a union of divine command
ethics with the perspectives of the natural law ethical system. 17

Making Morality Arbitrary
Hare correctly notes that one of the standard objections to an ethics of
divine commands is that it makes morality arbitrary (p. 74) as based solely
on the choices of the divine will. A standard reply has been to claim that
God's choices are not arbitrary because they are made in accordance with
the character of the divine nature (p. 72). Hare develops a different type of
reply which a Scotist might make to this objection.
Specifically, although the path to union with God specified in the commandments of the second table of the decalogue holds true only because of
divine commands, God's willing these precepts is not without reason since
they are chosen as a route to the final end of human beings (p. 73). Further,
they take us to a final end, union with God as co-lovers, which is "fitted to
our nature" (p. 77).
Hare's line of reply thus far is not sufficient to defeat the objection.
Consider this analogy. As a professor, I am making out the syllabus for a
course required for philosophy majors. In determining course requirements, I can try to design exam formats which achieve certain learning
goals (e.g., take-home essay exams which require "doing philosophy") or
simply schedule traditional in-class mid-term and final exams. Both the
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take-home essay exams and the in-class exams are paths to the end of students passing the course and, in turn, achieving a major in philosophy.
Nevertheless, scheduling in-class exams simply because this has traditionally been done has an air of arbitrariness in comparison with course
requirements tied to specific learning objectives.
Similarly, God could conceivably choose as the route to the final end of
human beings courses of action which seem inherently arbitrary (e.g., prohibiting marriage with any person with red hair) or perhaps downright
repugnant to our moral common sense. Indeed, Hare himself raises the
question whether we must say that God could have commanded bestiality
as the morally right expression of our sexuality (p. 74).
Thus it is critical that Hare goes beyond claiming that our final end of
union with God fits our human nature, also proposing that the moral law
regarding our neighbor which in fact obtains fits our nature in our present life
in that "we flourish after keeping the law" and "we deteriorate after breaking it" (p. 75). For example, the "command not to bear false witness fits the
human being's deep-seated desire to share life together with other humans
on the basis of verbal communication" (p. 77). Unfortunately, such comments represent Hare's own speculations rather than texts from Scotus (pp.
75-78).
What Scotus does say is that the precepts of the second table of the decalogue, which belong to the natural law in the broad sense, are "very much
in harmony" with the first practical principles known of necessity which
belong to the natural law in the strict sense. 18 It should be noted that Sctous
speaks directly of principles being in harmony with each other rather than of
principles being consonant with our human nature. Nevertheless, the
claim that the principles of the second table are "very much in harmony"
with natural law strictly speaking can still provide a defense against the
objection that they are arbitrary just because their status as moral precepts
depends on divine commands. And this still represents a different strategy
of reply to the arbitrariness objection than the standard one of invoking the
character of God's nature.
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